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ABSTRACT 
The significant set of public policy issues for economic analysis that arise from the 
tensions between the ‘special benefits’ of the Internet as a platform for innovation, 
and the drawbacks of the “anomalous” features of the Internet viewed as simply one 
among the array of telecommunications systems, is the focus of discussion in this 
chapter. Economists concerned with industrial organization and regulation (including 
antitrust and merger law) initially  found new scope for application of their expertise 
in conventional policy analyses of the Internet’s interactions with other segments of 
the telecommunications sector (broadcast and cable television, radio and telephone), 
and emphasized the potential congestion problems posed by user anonymity and flat 
rate pricing. Policy issues of a more dynamic kind have subsequently come to the 
fore. These involve classic tradeoffs between greater efficiency and producer and 
consumer surpluses today, and a potential for more innovation in Web-based 
products and service in the future. Many such tradeoffs involve choices such as that 
between policies that would preserve the original ‘end-to-end’ design of the original 
Internet architecture, and those that would be more encouraging of market-driven 
deployment of new technologies that afforded ISPs with greater market power the 
opportunity to offer (and extract greater profits from) restricted-Web services that 
consumers valued highly, such as secure and private VOIP.   
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Economic policy analysis and the Internet: 
Coming to terms with a telecommunications anomaly 
1 Introduction: The evolving nature and scope of ‘Internet economics’ 
    Everyday life in the world’s economically advanced societies has been 
touched and in some parts substantially altered by the advent of the Internet. Some 
among the developing economies also have felt the impacts of the explosive growth 
in global connectivity and the astounding proliferation of diverse innovations in 
applications software. These marvels distinguish the performance of the Internet as a 
communication infrastructure from that of its historical predecessors - such as the 
telegraph and telephone networks. It would have been truly remarkable had 
economists not been drawn to study the implications of this novel technology for 
creative expression, commercial activities and the organization of material life more 
generally.  
Those economists who focus on industrial organization and regulation of 
industry (including antitrust and merger law) have found new scope for application of 
their expertise to issues arising from the Internet’s consequences for the entire 
telecommunications sector. Another, more macroeconomically-oriented segment of 
the profession was absorbed, first, by the puzzling disjuncture between signs of rapid 
innovation in digital information technologies and the sluggish growth of productivity 
in the US economy - the so-called ‘computer productivity paradox’. Then, in the late 
1990s they found themselves absorbed in trying to understand what role (if any) had 
been played by the Internet in the sudden, and for many rather surprising productivity 
upsurge which has now outlived the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the post-2000 
recession. In recent years, various debates concerned with the nature and implications 
of the digital divide - in both its domestic and its international aspects - have engaged 
attention in still other quarters of the discipline, especially among researchers 
concerned with distributive inequalities and policies intended to address these. 
As scholars responding in their professional capacities to the developments 
that followed from the privatization and commercialization of the Internet in the mid-
1990s, economists manifested an understandable inclination to ‘lead from strength’ - 
that is, to discuss matters that they had already worked out thoroughly in other 
contexts of application. In academic economics circles during the 1990s emphasis 
was placed on counteracting the hype of media and industry presentations of the 
Internet as a revolutionary and transformative technological advance, primarily by 
showing how the familiar concepts and tools of microeconomic analysis could be 
used to illuminate the commercial developments that were emerging in cyberspace. 
This approach to the economics of the Internet drew on prior research that 
dealt with the special properties of information goods on the one hand, and on the 
extensive literature in the field of industrial organization that was concerned with 
competition and the regulation of telecommunications industries on the other. Key 
topics featured in the early ‘positive’ economics of the Internet literature included:  
•  the pricing of information goods and services sold online, and business 
    strategy in markets characterized by network externalities;  •  digital payment systems and electronic banking;  
•  the effects of particular instantiations of e-commerce such as financial 
    brokerage and auctions; 
•  the pricing of access to the network backbone; 
•  regulation of Internet interconnection agreements and their   
    implications for competitive entry and market structure. 
The latter topics occupied pride of place among the Internet policy issues on 
which economists initially focused, in good part because the regulation of network 
access had emerged as a prominent subject of analysis in the era following the break-
up of the Bell System and the movement to liberalization of telecommunication 
markets. McKnight and Bailey (1997) provide an influential collection of papers 
reflecting the leading edge of research on ‘Internet economics’ in the mid-1990s. The 
programmes of the annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference during 
1995-1999 reveal the same pattern of concentration on the part of the participants 
drawn from university faculties of economics in the United States.
1 Although the 
canvas of research has broadened subsequently, the foregoing remain core topics of 
university courses on ‘the economics of the Internet’.
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The general thrust of this approach to the economics of the Internet, therefore, 
has been that of ‘naturalizing’ the subject matter by focusing on those generic features 
that were common to broader categories of economic activity and public policy, 
particularly those affecting the telecommunications sector. There were, however, 
several respects in which it was recognized that the new communications 
infrastructure differed from its precursors in significant respects, and moreover, that 
these differences impeded an immediate application of the preexisting corpus of 
telecommunications economics that had been formulated in the context of connection-
oriented public switched telephone systems. The differentiating features manifested 
themselves in a variety of awkward, or anomalous performance dimensions that 
became apparent when the ‘network of networks’ was thrown open to general public 
and commercial traffic in the mid-1990s. 
Most salient among them, at least for economists, were the difficulties of 
pricing the usage of bandwidth in order to reduce delays in transmission arising from 
congestion, and of establishing commercial ventures based on the same ‘fee-for-
service’ business model that telephone operators were able to support. Related, but of 
less immediate economic interest, were the difficulties of providing users with 
services that permitted blocking delivery of nuisance messages (spam), offensive 
content, or politically disturbing material (whether of the neo-Nazi or Falun Gong 
variety); and protecting users from damage resulting from the malicious actions of 
others (for example, release of destructive software viruses, and denial of service 
attacks on web servers). Economic analysts could readily construe all of these as 
posing challenges for the design of resource allocation mechanisms that would render 
the Internet more efficient as a system of communications.  
What was not equally appreciated, however, was that each of those 
problematic aspects of the Internet was rooted in the technical specifications that were 
responsible for the performance capabilities of the Internet, which its users perceived 
to be its uniquely beneficial properties. The openness and transparency of the softly 
integrated ‘network of networks’ were attributes that derived from the distinctive 
‘end-to-end’ design of the architecture and transmission control mechanisms of the   - 3 -
new, connection-less communications system. These features enable the Internet to 
tolerate extreme diversity in the technical specifications of its constituent networks 
and platforms. That, in turn, made joining the system cheap, and highly attractive to 
new network operators, Internet service providers (ISPs) and users. In addition to 
facilitating the rapid extension of the system, the transparency of the end-to-end 
architecture - which placed the intelligent components at the ends rather in the core of 
the network - afforded a particularly accommodating platform for developers of 
applications innovations (David 2001a). Software could be designed to run on the 
computers situated at the network’s edges, taking data input and generating data 
output that traversed the intervening channels without having to pay attention to the 
specifics of the computer hardware and software that executed the message routing 
functions of the system.  
The existence of a significant set of public policy issues for economics to 
address, arising from the tension between the ‘anomalous drawbacks’ and the ‘special 
benefits’ of the Internet, is the focus of this chapter. Yet, for a considerable number of 
years it was not recognized explicitly in the emerging literature on Internet 
economics. One hesitates to fault a discipline that disposes its expert practitioners to 
talk about things they really do understand - and what the first economists to enter the 
field understood well was the pre-Internet world of telecommunications. The question 
is how far it is possible to go on the basis of understandings gained in contexts that 
have some similarities, but within which the subject of interest appears quite 
anomalous. I suggest that economists working in this area have tended - for rather too 
long - either to avoid focusing on the points of divergence between connection-
oriented and connection-less communications systems, or to propose ‘solutions’ to 
perceived inefficiencies that would have the effect of bringing the economics of the 
Internet more closely into line with that of the class of telecommunications systems 
with which they were already familiar. 
The understandable inclination of analysts to focus on features of a new the 
phenomenon that allow them to speak authoritatively may fail adequately to address 
core policy issues that are posed by radical innovations in technology - or in 
institutional design, for that matter. Therefore, I shall not review here the many 
important questions on which economists examining the Internet have been able to 
proceed quite usefully by recapitulating their prior concerns, and deploying familiar 
and well-honed tools to illuminate new developments. These have been ably surveyed 
elsewhere (Graham 2001). Instead, this chapter is directed to some policy issues that 
were avoided by initial forays into the economics of the Internet, and whose 
importance only lately has begun to come into clearer view. 
The discussion will proceed through the following steps. In the second section 
it will be shown, first, that the problem of congestion which was widely perceived to 
be a critical economic resource allocation challenge turned out to be largely 
chimerical; and, second, that economists were quite blasé in proposing solutions for 
that and other, related problems by introducing pricing mechanisms whose 
implementation required radical engineering modifications to the Internet. The latter, 
however, would jeopardize and possibly vitiate the unique, socially valuable 
performance capabilities of the system. The third section takes note of the fact that the 
recommendations for usage-sensitive pricing that were advanced by economists on 
static and rather narrow ‘efficiency’ grounds probably posed less of an actual threat to 
the continuation of the end-to-end design principle than the pressures that presently 
emanate from the private sector. The source of the latter are business ventures seeking the engineering modifications needed to enable them to offer users more profitable 
services, such as voice telephony over the Internet. The fourth section therefore 
addresses the questions of whether and on what grounds public policy might be 
mobilized to protect the architecture of the Internet - and thus preserve its beneficial 
properties of flexibility, extensibility, and hospitality as a platform for innovation. 
The final section concludes with some observations and suggestions regarding future 
policy-relevant directions for Internet economics. 
 
2  Remedies for ‘an unpriced resource’ 
Among the early contributions to the economics of the Internet perhaps the 
best known were those concerned with the sources of congestion, and how to deal 
with them (Mackie-Mason and Varian 1996; 1995a; 1995b). What economists 
typically brought to this discussion, perhaps all too predictably, was an abstract 
understanding of the phenomenon of congestion as a negative externality suffered by 
all users as a consequence of the lack of some effective mechanism restraining 
individuals’ claims on the limited available capacity. Casual analogies were drawn 
with the phenomena of overfishing and overgrazing of common resources, and the 
spectre was thus raised of the Internet becoming another case of a resource whose 
utility was seriously degraded by congestion arising from the absence of (bandwidth) 
usage-sensitive pricing. The mantra that subsequently has been imparted to novitiates 
in the field of Internet economics carries the same message, formulated in a less 
normative way (McKnight and Bailey 1997: 12): ‘Flat rate pricing does not provide 
an economic congestion control mechanism for bandwidth resource allocation’.  
Most of the proposals put forward by economists to correct this deficiency 
have favoured usage-pricing and a useful review is provided by Gupte (2001), 
although their schemes have varied considerably both in the degree of their economic 
sophistication and their complexity. At the upper end of that scale, the ‘smart market’ 
mechanism advocated in the pioneering work of Mackie-Mason and Varian (1995a) 
applies the principles of a Vickery auction: users would enter bids for network access 
that indicated a maximum willingness to pay, and routers would recognize the bids 
attached to each of the data-packets; all packets with bids exceeding some cutoff 
value would be admitted for forwarding. Given a fixed supply of bandwidth, the 
cutoff value would therefore be the lowest bid that corresponded to the transmission 
capacity of the system, and that price would be charged to all users whose bids were 
accepted. Consistent with marginal cost pricing principles, when there were only bids 
for network access that fell below the router’s cutoff value, the price would fall to 
zero. 
As the authors of this proposal soon acknowledged (Mackie-Mason and 
Varian 1995b): “usage-based pricing is itself expensive - it requires an infrastructure 
to track usage, prepare bills, and collect revenues.” A subsequent publication 
(Mackie-Mason and Varian 1997) took the matter further by recognizing that 
designing a congestion accounting and billing mechanism for a packet network is not 
so straightforward a proposition: Who should be charged, the sender of packets, or the 
receiver? Consider the situation in which a user downloads a file from a public 
archive: both the applications that are parties to the communication-transaction 
originate their own packets, but there is no way for the routers to identify the many 
packets forwarded from the archive as being responses to the session initiated by the 
small number of packets carrying the user’s request for the file. If such requests   - 5 -
resulted in congestion, how could the behaviour of the users be modified by charging 
the costs to the passive party in the transaction (the archive)? To allocate the 
congestion costs between the parties, the public archive in this case would have to 
have installed a billing mechanism, permitting the subsequent reassignment of the 
charges to the user that had instigated the file transfer.  
Just what changes would be required in the architecture and transmission 
control algorithms to enable the routers to do all this was not considered. But, the 
design of the Internet’s transmission control protocols (TCP) does not allow 
monitoring the state of congestion everywhere in the network, and so the 
implementation of the suggested pricing mechanism, like that of quality of service 
(QOS) schemes, would require monitoring and information collection functions that 
are not supported and - with the continuing growth of the network - would become 
increasingly taxing for the simple routers to accomplish in real time. Moreover, the 
cost allocation and billing requirements for congestion control via QOS systems 
would call for the collection, transmission, and processing of internal traffic 
information as well as user bids, and the provision of discretionary network routing 
capabilities. To imagine all that being implemented without substantial engineering 
departures from the principles of an end-to-end architecture is difficult indeed 
(Odlyzko 1998: 26-7; CSTB 2001: 99-100), and so it seems rather remarkable that the 
larger implications of such changes have not been more prominent matters of concern 
for the proponents of such schemes. 
More remarkable still is the continuing robustness of the economics 
literature’s fixation on congestion-pricing, the pertinent facts notwithstanding. 
Congestion was not a major problem on the Internet during the early 1990s, when its 
opening to commercial traffic first directed attention to the problem posed by the 
impending need to introduce usage-pricing; nor has the forecast condition of chronic 
congestion materialized subsequently. Delays experienced on the Internet will indeed 
be caused by queues, which are an intrinsic part of congestion control and the sharing 
of capacity (CSTB 2001: 98ff). But there can be other sources of delay. Indeed, 
because ISPs are not required either to collect or release data on transmission delays, 
dropped packet rates, or other network performance variables, there continues to be 
much disagreement over the exact extent to which many of the service problems 
experienced by Internet users are properly attributable to congestion, rather than other 
causes. The frequently observed delays in the delivery of e-mail, for example, are 
thought to be almost always the result of mail server faults that result in a large 
proportion of the load being generated by the retransmission of packets; and the 
painful slowness that web surfers encounter during peak hours is ascribed to 
nonresponding web servers (Odlyzko 1998; Huitema 1997, as cited by Cave and 
Mason 2001). 
True congestion delay occurs on the Internet whenever the combined traffic 
needing to be forwarded onto a particular outgoing link exceeds the capacity of that 
link. The design of the TCP assigns to the sending nodes the responsibility for 
regulating the flow of packets on the basis of cumulative acknowledgments from 
(adjacent) receiving nodes of the arrival of packets sent to them. This adaptive control 
mechanism operates in response to ‘packet losses’ that reach a rate signalling the 
presence of congestion to the routers that share the link. Thus, when congestion 
occurs, a packet may be delayed, sitting in an adjacent router’s queue awaiting 
dispatch, and so will arrive later than some other packet from the same message that 
has not been subject to queuing. The result is delay in the reassembly of all the packets that contain the message, a condition described as ‘latency’ in the language of 
telecommunications engineers. (When queue lengths vary, and some queues fill up, 
packets will be dropped by the router and therefore need to be resent, causing 
variations of the duration of delays and the condition known as ‘jitter’). Congestion 
typically is a transient phenomenon, however, lasting only for the interval during 
which the TCP mechanism adapts to the available capacity by slowing the outgoing 
packet rate. It can reach drastic levels, however, if the capacities of the nodes 
available to each router fall below the minimum transmission rate provided by the 
control protocol.  
The mechanism of congestion control provided by TCP, therefore, is simply to 
push back on the traffic source dynamically, in response to the detection of 
congestion inside the network, until it no longer is able to accept the offered load. 
This simple algorithm is incapable of discriminating among the initiators of the 
offered load, or among various types of applications that are generating traffic. Hence 
it cannot serve to shape the behaviour of individual users on the Internet, or even that 
of classes of users. Moreover, this congestion control algorithm is neither enforced on 
the Internet, nor is it even part of the protocol architecture of some applications that 
do not implement TCP - such as streaming video and UDP (User Data Protocol) 
(CSTB 1994: 189, 201 n. 40). Those applications consequently can be viewed as 
taking unfair advantage of other applications, such as email programs that do 
implement TCP.  
Today, congestion generally is understood to be rare within the backbone 
networks of North American ISPs. The obvious explanation for the failure of chronic, 
paralyzing congestion to materialize under the conditions of unpriced usage lies in the 
rapid expansion of capacity to accommodate the growth of Internet hosts and traffic; 
and because most of the widely used applications tolerated the congestion control 
mechanisms provided by TCP. Whether bandwidth increases can continue to keep 
pace with the growth of demand, of course, depends on whether QOS-enabling 
enhancements are made in the network that will greatly increase the offering of 
bandwidth-hungry services, and the degree to which competition will either check the 
ability of ISPs to differentially price such services in a manner that curtails their needs 
for heavy investment in capacity, or result in rivalries among the larger ISPs to stake 
out more ‘real estate on the Net in order to attract an expanded customer base. 
Instead of appearing ubiquitously throughout the rest of the network, however, 
congestion does appear to be concentrated at particular bottlenecks created by 
disparities in the provision of capacity. As has been noted above, the links (exchange 
points) between ISPs - and especially the public network access points (NAPs) - are 
as a rule much more heavily congested than the links within the service providers’ 
respective networks (Odlyzko 1998; CSTB 2001: 99, 117). Although the links 
between customers’ local area networks (LANs) or residences and their ISPs are also 
frequently congested, the difficulty arises from the organizational delays or the 
expense entailed in increasing the capacity of the connection. Persistent congestion 
has been documented at several international links, where long and variable queuing 
delays, as well as high packet loss rates, have been measured (Paxson 1999; CSTB 
2001: 99-100). Here again, however, the proximate source of the problem appears to 
be rooted in institutional circumstances affecting the provision and allocation of 
capacity at strategic connection points, rather than the endemic condition of 
unrestrained bandwidth usage envisaged by economic theorizing.   - 7 -
A cynical commentator might conclude that the stream of ingenious proposals 
from economists to fix the problem of congestion on the Internet, in typically ignoring 
the possible strategic explanations for congestion at the public NAPs, and proposing 
the introduction into the network’s core of the intelligence needed to operate a 
sophisticated pricing mechanism, come down to the expedient of making the network 
less and less like the Internet, and more closely akin to a connection-oriented 
conventional public switched telephone network (PSTN). Quite obviously, however, 
had such a design been embraced to begin with, many other difficulties posed by the 
peculiar open-architecture would have been obviated as well. Along with removal of 
the obstacles to a mass transfer fee-for-service business model, this would reduce the 
myriad  practical  difficulties that local communities linked to the Internet now 
encounter in seeking to control the content of messages bearing objectionable content. 
In a connection-oriented system it is much more feasible to rapidly and accurately 
identify the locations, if not the identities of agents engaging in the electronic 
transmission of content that recipients deem to be pernicious - and to set about 
mobilizing political, social, and legal countermeasures. There would, therefore, be 
less need than presently exists to devote resources to the development of the still 
rather coarse-grained ‘geo-locator technologies’ that are being use to create targets for 
direct mail advertising and sales techniques based on the characteristics of the 
recipients’ neighbourhoods. Less attention would also have to be given to figuring out 
whether such technologies can be made sufficiently reliable to be employed to control 
the distribution of objectionable content on the Internet, in the ways that would 
parallel the familiar content-regulating actions of political authorities who can 
identify the originating parties and have legal jurisdiction over the geographical 
territories in which they are situated.  
Whether or not the removal of anonymity, and the reimposition of greater 
controls on individuals’ access to content are desirable in some circumstances, is 
quite another matter (Engel and Keller 2000). The point is simply that the congestion-
pricing solution envisaged for the Internet is not the narrow matter of economic 
efficiency that economists have appeared to be presenting; its implementation would 
require an architectural revolution in which the Internet as we know it would have 
disappeared. Correspondingly, in that brave new world, debates about the conflicting 
desiderata of privacy, anonymity, and security would continue, but they would cease 
to be policy matters that had a peculiar ‘Internet’ aspect and would simply reprise the 
issues that society has found ways of resolving for other communications media - 
physical newspapers and books, plain old telephones, radio, films, and television (de 
Sola Pool 1990). 
 
3  A path to the end of ‘end to end’? 
Will the pressures to insert new capabilities into the core of the network really 
have the deleterious effects envisaged, and if undesirable consequences materialized, 
would it not be possible to restore the status quo ante? The likelihood is that even the 
unintended ending of an integral end-to-end Internet would not be readily reversible, 
and that the benefits thereby lost might prove difficult if not virtually impossible to 
recover on a later, improved successor to the global information infrastructure. This 
last point deserves further elaboration, which can conveniently be provided by 
returning to consideration of the concrete issue of permitting cable companies in the 
ISP market to create proprietary sub-networks on which QOS technologies are used to offer differentiated service choices to subscribers. Users of a particular service, 
however, would have access only to the music and the video that their ISP had 
designated, possibly also to a designated IP voice telephony service, and might be 
similarly locked in to a particular suite of other web based services and applications 
software. 
A concrete scenario in which this possibility might be realized is suggested by 
the emergence of the Skype VoIP (voice over Internet protocol) service in 2003.
3  
This service is based upon the distinctive end-to-end features of the ‘old’ Internet and, 
as a consequence, free-rides on the bandwidth made available for services like the 
World Wide Web or e-mail. Skype’s business model, which offers free voice calls 
between users who are connected to the Internet, is based upon charges for receiving 
and placing calls to users who are using other networks as well as charging for 
additional, premium, services such as voice mail. According to the market research 
company Evalueserve,
4 Skype had recruited 13 million users worldwide within two 
years of its founding. Sustained rapid growth of Skype will not only have a significant 
impact on the revenues and profitability of telecommunication network operators, but 
also is likely to generate significant congestion in the Internet. In addition, since 
Skype is a peer-to-peer technology, its use involves employing resources from 
individual user machines and their networks to ‘relay’ calls or store voice messages. 
This has raised corporate concerns about security and local network congestion and 
has led to responses such as the products offered by Bitek International which block 
Skype services.
5 
This situation is very similar to the past use of peer-to-peer networks to 
transfer music files (Skype was created by the same individuals that created Kazaa, a 
leading peer-to-peer file exchange application). Skype, however, involves a more 
complex set of issues. In some countries, for example, Israel, the use of Skype to 
bypass the local telecommunication operator is illegal and it is likely that congestion 
effects will prompt ISPs and network operators to employ blocking technologies such 
as those available from Bitek International. In other countries, the employment of 
blocking or filtering technologies is likely to be more decentralized and involve 
corporate networks or specific ISPs. These developments are likely to lead to a 
growth in ‘restricted web’ services, that is, those that utilize some applications and 
block others. It is a short step from these developments to legitimizing Skype by 
incorporating it as a specific service offered by leading ISPs. Skype users would thus 
be assured (in countries permitting such services) that they would be able to retain 
connectivity with other Skype users as well as telephone services to connect to others.   
There are reasons to expect that having put in place a restricted-web ISP 
service offering, such as Skype, the ISP in question might well be receptive to 
allowing compatibility between this sub-network and other similar subnetworks. The 
economic logic of this situation differs from that which governs in the general 
analysis of compatibility standardization for network interoperability - where it is 
generally found that small networks seek connectivity with larger ones, and the latter 
have stronger incentives to remain aloof from rivals of comparable size.
6 By linking 
with similarly sized networks, an ISP with a large network base could offer 
subscribers other enhanced services that, like voice telephony, are latency-sensitive, 
such as multiple-player interactive video games, and a larger choice among the set of 
preselected applications. The value of integrating to achieve compatibility with 
smaller ISPs would remain comparatively small, and so, in this market setting, the 
dynamics lead toward a high degree of market power concentrated in the hands of a   - 9 -
small number of ISPs, and a large fringe of ISPs whose clientele remains cut off from 
these enhanced services.  
Thus entrenched, the dominant ISPs would be in a position to extract some if 
not most of the rent that might otherwise flow to the developers of applications 
innovations, in exchange for making these available for use by their clientele. Lacking 
that access, the developers would be confined to exploiting niche markets at the 
fringes of the network, where their products would remain beyond the reach of the 
subscribers to the large ISPs. Nothing in this picture suggests that the emergent 
structure of a partitioned network would be likely to be voluntarily dismantled by the 
incumbent, or vertically integrated ISPs, nor successfully attacked by an entrant 
possessing a novel and superior application technology. An entrant with the capital 
resources required to establish a new, competitive, vertically integrated ISP, 
moreover, would have every incentive to seek compatibility with an existing large 
service provider, and an aggressive newcomer aggressive might expand by stealing 
the original incumbent’s clientele. But, in addition to requiring the financial backing 
to create the additional network capacity required for the implementation of that 
strategy, the successful entrant would replicate the initial situation, and pose an even 
greater entry barrier to the next innovator.  
A mitigating consideration to be noted in the foregoing scenario is that 
although the technological enhancements to the Internet would create new 
opportunities for ISPs to extract greater rents (consumer surplus) from their customers 
by means of discriminatory pricing schemes (Mandjes 2004; Odlyzko 2004), the 
strategy of vertical bundling of networking services and Internet-based applications, 
nevertheless, would provide additional benefits for a large segment of the Internet 
population. The technologists who created an end-to-end architecture, and who value 
it particularly for the support it provided to applications innovators, are less burdened 
than the typical Internet user by having to install, configure, upgrade, and maintain 
the software of each and every one of the rapidly growing number of applications that 
must be attached at the networks’ end points. This state of affairs can be expected 
only to become more burdensome. As Blumenthal and Clark (2001: 72) perceptively 
observe: 
“The importance of ease of use will only grow with the changing 
nature of consumer computing. The computing world today includes 
more than PCs. It has embedded processors, portable user interface 
devices such as computing appliances or personal digital assistants 
(PDAs, such as Palm devices), Web-enabled television and advanced 
set-top boxes, new kinds of cell-phones, and so on. If the consumer is 
required to set up and configure separately each networked device he 
[sic!] owns, what is the chance that at least one of them will be 
configured incorrectly. That risk would be lower with delegation of 
configuration, protection, and control to a common point, which can 
act as an agent for a pool of devices. This common point would 
become a part of the application execution context there would no 
longer be a single indivisible end-point where the application runs.” 
While pointing to the threat to the preservation of the open-network 
architecture, this acknowledges that the creation by ISPs of enclaves containing 
advanced services would be one way in which the multitude of less technically 
sophisticated users could obtain specialized (and correspondingly standardized) network applications-integrating services. Thus, in regard to this issue -- as is the case 
in so many others, network policymakers face the classic tradeoff of securing the 
immediate benefits of closed standardization by sacrificing the technological 
flexibility that is conducive to future radical innovations (David 1995).  
 
4  Policy priorities and protection of the Internet’s architecture 
It has been seen that among the many technological fixes proposed for 
enhancing the Internet’s performance some are not so innocuous, because they would 
entail inserting intelligence into the core of the network. The likely impact of these 
induced innovations therefore would be the alteration of the distinctive end-to-end 
architecture, pushing the future path of the network’s evolution more towards 
emulating the performance features (both good and bad) associated with a 
connection-oriented telecommunications system - the familiar paradigm of which 
exists in the PSTN (David and Steinmueller 1996). Will the changing balance among 
the interests of the communities using the information infrastructure, inevitably force 
a sacrifice of the global infrastructure’s transparency and openness, thereby raising 
new barriers to the invention and diffusion of valuable applications? Inasmuch as a 
technological drift away from the original Internet’s end-to-end architectural design 
should not be regarded as an inexorable process beyond the reach of social control, 
there is scope for policy interventions to check such a course of evolution. It must be 
hoped, then, that promoting wider understanding of the issues at stake can increase 
the political feasibility of arriving at rational policy priorities. At least, that is the 
spirit in which the following commentary on the identification and balancing among 
conflicting goods will proceed.  
A first appropriate step is to ask whether the net impact of any proposed 
movement in that direction would be socially beneficial. In view of the prospective 
emergence of a broadband Internet on which QOS will be more widely implemented 
by ISPs competing for customers while seeking the means to charge what the 
(multimedia) traffic will bear, the question might be asked whether the time has come 
for end-to-end to end. It could be argued that inasmuch as the days of Internet1 as a 
unified global infrastructure providing a receptive platform for rapid innovation and 
experimentation with networks are numbered, the best course of action would be to 
make whatever changes are required in the core of the network to quickly reap the 
benefits of the available new services on a  “users’ Internet.’’ That is to say, we 
should come to terms with the immanent tendency of the evolutionary dynamics 
driven by the needs of the maturing market for a differentiated Internet service, and 
think about other ways to provide a network environment that would stimulate the 
continuation of amazing innovations.  
Such a view would counsel turning attention to the construction of a separate, 
very high speed internetwork as the test bed and experimental commercial market for 
advanced services, which would be designed to provide the features of openness and 
flexibility that have proved so encouraging to the development of more powerful 
digital technologies. This might be called Internet2+ to distinguish it from the actual 
federally funded backbone created in the U.S. to continue the National Science 
Foundation’s Network (NSFNET) research role. There is something to be said for this 
vision of a cyclical regeneration of a new inter-networking environment that would 
revive some characteristics of the original. It acknowledges the important symbiotic 
relationship between the mature PSTN infrastructure on which packet switching and   - 11 -
the novel technologies of the ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects 
Administration Network) and NSFNET could be erected; and it recognizes the 
fertility of experimental research communities as sources of user-designed 
technological innovations. But, unfortunately, it ignores the crucial fact that an 
important aspect of the historical experience cannot be replicated or revived by these 
means.  
The nub of the problem is that to develop innovations that are readily 
available for deployment on the Internet as it exists, one needs a test bed with its 
technical features. Yet, for the communities that would have access to Internet2+, and 
especially for those groups that are engaged in advancing the frontiers of network 
engineering, the high value use would be to develop applications that utilized the 
enhanced properties of that infrastructure rather than the more limited capabilities of 
Internet1 - or the still less accommodating infrastructure into which the latter would 
be tending to evolve. 
Next, one should consider the net balance of gains against losses: would the 
contemplated enhancements in the quality of differentiated services, and in the ability 
of service providers to engage in price discrimination among the users of the Internet, 
compensate for the economic welfare costs entailed - in terms of curtailed future 
scaleability and a slowed pace of innovation in applications? Several grounds for 
scepticism regarding the value of the gains seem worth keeping in mind. 
To begin with, the incremental social benefit of upgrading the Internet to carry 
real-time audio traffic is not obviously overwhelming, given the existence of other 
technological means of providing a large part of the world’s population with access to 
voice telephony (via cellular radio and satellite transmission) at lower fixed costs than 
those entailed in laying copper wire or fibre-optic cabling. Certainly, Internet 
telephony could be integrated into new, multimedia services. Yet, there is a 
disjunction here between a strategy directed toward opening profit opportunities in 
the developed economies - to elicit continued private sector investment in augmenting 
the broadband infrastructure available to users in those countries - and a policy that 
also takes account of the situation in the world at large. 
While cellphone technology has opened the benefits of rapid, global 
communications to large cohorts in the developing economies, it remains unsuitable 
for sparsely populated regions and geographically remote sites, just as it is not 
capable of supporting the very high bandwidth communications that are likely 
eventually to be in demand there. But systems of low earth orbit satellites (LEOS), 
which are designed to provide two-way, low-latency, point-to-point transmissions, 
will be available to fill these significant service gaps. According to expert engineering 
opinion, the seamless linking of LEO satellite constellations into the worldwide 
communications infrastructure is a development that can be expected to take place in 
the relatively near future.
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For the developing economies, however, it is accepted that even to provide 
substantial narrowband coverage, considerable amounts of public funding for 
upgrading existing telecommunications infrastructures would be necessary; and some 
of that is likely to be provided by subsidized loans and transfers through multinational 
cooperative agencies. It must therefore be recognized that the social rate of return on 
public (and private) investments in this infrastructure would be reduced substantially 
if the present core of the Internet were to be modified by engineering changes that 
deviated from the principles of end-to-end. To permit alterations to the architecture of the backbone networks in the high income countries, in order to provide users there 
with Internet voice telephony (along with business or entertainment services 
integrating real-time video), would effectively mean curtailing the access afforded 
newly connected users in the world’s poorer societies to existing information tools 
and global data resources. 
The foregoing remarks address possible discrepancies between the private 
incentives driving the Internet’s technological evolution, and the social value of the 
enhancements that would thus be achieved. They have not touched on the need to 
explore engineering improvements that can be implemented (at the edges of the 
network) in ways that would not compromise the performance attributes that derived 
from the Internet’s end-to-end architecture. Content labelling conventions are one 
example of the kind of “improvements” that, if voluntary adopted or enforced on 
content providers, would enhance the efficiency of filtering at the endpoints of the 
network. 
But another important set of alternatives to introducing control mechanisms in 
the network’s core that remains to be considered is the large class of non-
technological options. In view of the fact that the origins of many of the vexing 
dysfunctionalities of the Internet derive from the historical displacement of this 
technology system from the peculiar, highly regulated behavioural and organizational 
contexts within which it was created and initially used, an obvious option to be 
considered is the restoration of some of the former modes of regulating users’ 
behaviours. The Internet may have been a technology that quite by accident was well-
attuned to the laissez-faire spirit of the era in which it was publicly introduced. Yet, 
an ideologically driven commitment to go on thinking exclusively in the same vein 
about ways to overcome the problems posed by the ‘network of networks’, rejecting 
social engineering in favour of solutions found through Internet reengineering, is most 
likely to sacrifice the Internet’s unique and valuable pro-innovation features. There is 
no a priori reason to conclude that the most efficient solution path is one that relies 
solely on fixes that can be technologically implemented. 
Yet, proposed regulation and interventions by public authorities continue to be 
opposed on the argument that such actions are inimical to the Internet’s survival as a 
global interaction space free from governmentally imposed structures of social 
regulation. Current rhetorical support for relying on engineers to fix whatever might 
really need mending, rather than letting legislators and lawyers loose in cyberspace, 
presents a curious mixture of attitudes. These are compounded from the libertarian 
philosophy that is pervasive among survivors of the Internet’s pioneering user groups, 
strains of anarchosyndicalism that have emerged in the ethos of the latter-day hacker 
culture, and the generic laissez-faire disposition of the Internet’s more recently 
arrived community of business entrepreneurs. The holders of pro-commercial and 
anti-commercial sentiments alike appear quite comfortable making common cause 
against the intrusion of government regulations that are socially engineered. This, it 
should be recognized, presents an essential political and philosophical position, quite 
distinct from the utilitarian rationale that would give priority to preserving the 
distinctive end-to-end architecture of the Internet - especially inasmuch as serving the 
latter priority might call for the development of new, institutional mechanisms of 
governance.  
Lawyers looking at the evolving Internet are naturally disposed to pose this 
issue in terms of a political choice between the regulation of human actions by laws   - 13 -
or governance by ‘Code’ - the encompassing term used by Lessig (1999) in referring 
to the architectural configuration of networks and the location of access points, the 
design of hardware, operating systems, languages, data formats, and applications 
software. Economists, it would seem, would have something helpful to contribute to 
debates on these questions, by directing attention to the relative costs of alternative 
modes of regulation in network environments, especially in view of the significant 
externalities and irreversibilities that are likely to be entailed by introducing either 
technological or institutional modifications in the existing regime (see Mueller 2002). 
Furthermore, approaching some questions that involve the governance of 
human behaviour in cyberspace from the perspective of the economics of crime and 
punishment also may be a useful way to mediate in debates between the engineers and 
the lawyers: the quest for perfect technological mechanisms of detection and 
suppression of malefactors is only relevant in a perfect world, and it is possible to 
compensate for reduced probabilities of being caught by raising the penalties visited 
on those who are. This approach may not be good enough in some areas of concern, 
and other technological safeguards will be needed to protect humans and vital 
technological systems alike from grave damage. But much of the ‘protective’ control 
of behaviour afforded under the law has been found to work tolerably well with this 
mixed approach.  
For those reasons and still others, the relevant policy questions ought not to be 
construed in terms of making either/or choices. It is important to resist the rhetoric of 
much contemporary discussion of economic policy, which tends to offer only extreme 
alternatives. Participants are too often driven into opposing camps, one side calling 
for the introduction of government controls, and the other placing its faith on the 
further development of decentralized, automatic, supposedly neutral, and (market-
like) regulatory mechanisms that can better resist political manipulation and so 
preserve greater scope for human volition. The following statement exemplifies the 
polarizing impact of applying the technologists’ Internet philosophy to decide on the 
best means of protecting privacy on the Net:  
 
“[T]he cyperpunk credo can be roughly paraphrased as ‘privacy 
through technology, not through legislation’. If we can guarantee 
privacy protection through the laws of mathematics rather than the 
laws of men and whims of bureaucrats, then we will have made an 
important contribution to society. It is this vision which guides and 
motivates our approach to Internet privacy.” (Goldberg, Wagner, and 
Brewer. 1997, quoted in Blumenthal and Clark 2001: 84 n. 52) 
A full-blown systems design approach, by contrast, would hold that if the 
benefits of the Internet’s end-to-end architecture are to be retained, some 
technological solutions simply cannot be substituted for other, socio-legal modes of 
governing the behaviour of agents on the Internet. Rather than being viewed as 
antithetical substitutes, the potential complementary of technological and institutional 
mechanisms governing the digital communications infrastructure should be explored 
in a coordinated manner.  
There is thus a case to be made for devoting greater attention to matching the 
technological innovations of the Internet by mobilizing other, nontechnologically 
implemented modes of regulation. Greater consideration surely is worth directing to the design of legal, political, and social rule structures and administrative procedures, 
of the kind that proved to be efficacious in supporting successful economic 
exploitation of previous technical advances in communications networks. In this 
connection it is worth recalling that the oldest international treaty organization in 
existence today is the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This 
institution, which began its life in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, 
provided the model in whose image virtually all subsequent international treaty-based 
organizations were created (David and Schurmer 1996; Schmidt and Werle 1998). 
While that may suffice to suggest the possibility that fruitful innovations in 
international rule-making fora can be driven by the opportunities, or problems, that 
new technologies create, there is no doubt that today very formidable challenges are 




Even as the Internet comes of age, the technology of the global information 
infrastructure and the organization of the communication service industries based on 
it continue to undergo significant changes. The main message carried by the 
foregoing discussion is that many microeconomic policy recommendations and 
engineering proposals that have been presented as incremental modifications to 
enhance the performance capabilities of the Internet actually may have radical 
implications for the future course of its technological evolution. These have been seen 
to involve rather esoteric matters that might appear best left to be decided by 
engineering specialists, and experts in the intricacies of telecommunications 
regulations. But decisions taken in those realms will powerfully shape the future 
performance characteristics of the Internet. In that way, they will have important 
consequences for the nature, size, and distribution of the economic and social benefits 
that it yields. 
It is understandable that the initial reaction of many economists who had 
developed familiarity and expertise in the context of studying mature 
telecommunications networks (that is, the PSTN) found it natural to transfer to the 
sphere of Internet economics the modes of analyses and policy prescriptions that 
were, so to speak, most ready to hand. Thus, a great deal of prominence has been 
given to the discussion of principles that should govern optimal pricing of access to 
the transport/bearer layer of the Internet, a matter of undoubted importance for 
existing and would-be service providers. In a technologically dynamic network 
setting such as that of the Internet, however, the feasibility and terms of entry also 
depend on nonprice policies, including those affecting technical compatibility 
standards, and regulations governing the interconnection strategies of incumbent 
service providers (Cave and Mason 2001). Over the long run, the technical rules of 
the game affecting physical interconnection are likely to be more consequential than 
pricing formulae in their effects on the growth and distribution of available 
bandwidth, competition in the ISP market, and the rate of innovation in applications 
on the Internet.  
Bertrand Russell once remarked that we must ‘tolerate specialists because they 
do good work.’ Perhaps it would be more generous to speak of appreciation rather 
than toleration, but the point remains that in matters whose potential implications for 
human welfare are as important as those at hand, more than narrow expertise is   - 15 -
wanted. The story of the Internet’s development justly can be presented as a 
remarkable case of ‘success by design’ (CSTB (2001: 34) invokes this phase in 
discussing architectural principles). Equally, it may be read as a path-dependent tale 
of fortuitous engineering design decisions that were made with little consideration for 
aspects that have turned out to be problematic for many of the purposes and social 
contexts in which the resultant, wonderfully open and flexible technology would be 
used.
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As societies around the world continue to wrestle with difficult technical 
challenges and policy quandaries that have their origins in historically remote 
decisions that proved to be essentially irreversible, an obvious question to be asked is 
whether it has become possible now to proceed differently. The historical economics 
approach (David 2001b) that informs much of the foregoing discussion carries some 
additional and potentially more provocative suggestions for rethinking the economics 
of the telecommunications regulation in the age of the Internet. Because economic 
analysis of industrial organization and public regulation of telecommunications 
utilities was developed with reference to industries based on a mature network 
technology, practitioners in this area remain too inclined to start from the assumption 
that the technology is given. 
This is seldom the case, and it is palpably misleading when applied to the 
situation of the Internet. Therefore, perhaps the most important general lesson to be 
drawn for the future of Internet policy analysis is for economists to start thinking 
about the ways in which the structure of the existing markets, and the uneven and 
uncoordinated regime of regulation and nonregulation, may induce research and 
technological innovation to take some directions while discouraging technical 
progress from proceeding in others.  
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1 See  http://www.tprc.org/ARCHIVES.HTM , accessed 17 March, 2006.  
2 For a representative example, drawn more or less at random from online listings, see, Prof. 
P. K. Dutta’s course lectures: http://www.columbia.edu/~pkd1/lecture20002.html, ac-
cessed March 10, 2006.  
3  For a discussion of policy and regulatory approaches to VoIP in the US, see Cannon 
(2005) and more generally, OECD (2006). 
4  See http://www.evalueserve.com/, accessed 17 March, 2006. 
5  See http://www.bitek.com/, accessed 17 March, 2006. 
6  Farrell and Saloner 1986; David and Greenstein 1990, for a review of the early literature; 
Shapiro and Varian 1999, especially chapters 7 and 9 on strategies in standards wars; 
and Varian, Farrell and Shapiro 2004.  
  
7  Private communication from Robert Spinrad, 9 May 2000. 
8 On concepts of irreversibility, path-dependence, and ‘path-constrained melioration’, see 
David 2001b. 